The L-Shaped Safety Hazard
by
Christian Cameron
The purpose of this article is to bring to the attention of all officers and NCOs a growing problem in our period and area of reenacting. I’m going to suggest some possible solutions, but the ultimate solution will lie with every one of us exercising discipline and control on the battlefield. The “L” shaped battle line has caused three safety incidents already this season.
The “L” shaped safety hazard is a product of the last ten years of research and drill done particularly by our unit and a number of other units with whom we associate. It is the product of our own success in learning to behave more like British Regulars—faster, more maneuverable, better drilled—and as such, the growth of these safety incidents threatens a great deal of hard work we’ve put in over the years.
The “L” shaped safety violation is caused when the attacking force in a large scenario successfully wins the ground on the flank of the adversary’s line and then attempts to capitalize by breaking that flank and rolling up the adversary force. This is classic 18th C. warfare. In the world of reenacting, it is also virtually the only way to move an opponent (since few opponents recognize, much less respect, better firepower).
Usually, after the attacker wins the ground on the flank, the defender rushes troops to the threatened flank, creating an “L” shape in his line. The defender’s attempts to stabilize his line are rendered even more critical by the possession of artillery—worst of all, if the artillery is just at the corner of the line, as it was at Lansing Manor this spring. Artillery in the hobby, by its very nature and with only a handful of exceptions, is immobile. The presence of a gun at the “elbow” in the “L” means that the defender cannot easily give ground.
In fact, viewed by an impartial safety observer, and assuming the initial attack and turning maneuver on the flank were safe, the ultimate “fault” of the safety issue usually lies with the defender. Surprised, and threatened with humiliation, he over-reinforces his flank and puts his unit commanders in a situation where they cannot maneuver or retreat. If the attackers are superior in numbers and firepower, the more aggressive of them will become increasingly frustrated—even angry—that the defender will not move, will not budge, will not behave like an 18th C. commander. Eventually, the discipline of some units frays enough to start a general attack—usually on the elbow of the “L”, which is the weakest point. Because the men at the elbow cannot retreat (lay out some playing cards if you doubt me) the possibility of real hazard exists, and it is worse if there is a gun anywhere close to the elbow. At the very least, hard feeling will now arise on both sides.
It is easy for the defender to claim that the attacker was “unsafe” as it is usually the attacker who actually “crossed the line” and committed a safety violation—inside the shot cone of a loaded gun, or inside the 20-yard safety limit, or what have you. In fact, a chain of poor decisions has created the incident.
The simplest, and best, way to avoid the “L” shaped situation in a scripted scenario is to avoid situations where the defender’s army will be forced to refuse a flank, or to make clear to each side the parameters of fighting in the “L”. However, we do lots of wargaming, and in “Free Form” tacticals, it is equally important to avoid the situation. There are a few simple solutions.
Prevention:
The DEFENDER must always allow himself SPACE to maneuver. It is all too common in our hobby for the defender to anchor a flank on the crowd, or fight with his back to a lake or to a major obstacle like a cliff or deep woods. No 18th C. general would ever have done any such thing. One of the first lessons for every period commander was to have a secure line of retreat. A defender should always choose ground where he can deploy his army, with a RESERVE for emergencies, and still have a minimum of 100 yards in which to retire in good order to secure his flanks—200 yards is better. The length of his formed battle line should probably dictate the clear distance in the defender’s line of retreat—my rule of thumb is that for every yard of frontage my army occupies, I need two yards behind me. This space will allow me, if required, to wheel THE ENTIRE FORCE to face a threat to the flank. And a commander needs the same space towards at least one flank—so that his army can respond by retiring to a flank. IF a flank has to rest on the crowd, both commanders MUST agree in advance under what circumstances the “crowd” flank is to be attacked.
Gunners must be prepared to abandon their guns. Gunners often believe that it is their God-given right to continue loading and firing no matter what the tactical situation, and that the presence of an enemy unit 30 yards away to their flank shouldn’t deter them from loading again. That’s foolishness. A real gun crew would know that their gun was hopelessly compromised the moment a formed enemy body got within 50 yards of their flank, and they would move their gun or abandon it. IT IS UNSAFE FOR A GUN TO CONTINUE LOADING AND FIRING WHILE THE ADVERSARY'S FORCE IS ON THEIR FLANK IN STRENGTH.
I understand that, as a gunner, it is embarrassing to lose a gun. The answer to this is to stop fielding incorrect crews of minimal size incapable of dragging their guns and prolonging at infantry speeds. Such guns are all too common, but are now twenty years out of date in the standard of representation of our hobby. Any gun being allowed to field in a major tactical scenario should have a full crew and drag ropes. Those guns should be required to be able to move in any direction at the same speed as the infantry. We know, from recent experience, that this is not even a little bit difficult. It’s easy. Failure to move guns is lazy thinking and poor safety policy. It will always be more to an event’s advantage to have ONE gun with a full crew and drag ropes than to have three guns with tiny crews whose immobility must eventually lead to the defender having no option to maneuver.
As a defender, the possessor of a mobile gun will suddenly find he has unlimited options to retire—or respond by moving his gun. This step combined with the preservation of a clear line of retreat will allow any defender so many options that the “L” shape should never develop—or if it develops, he has simple options to return the battle to safety and maneuver.
Sadly, as we are often the aggressors, both of these options depend on event organizers and our adversaries to make changes that will keep pace with the improvement of tactics and speed in the hobby. For the NCOs and officers in the Northern Brigade, we have a different solution.
Corrective Action:
We should consider honor—sportsmanship if you like—first in every situation. Will running this unit into the ground humiliate them? What possible gain will there be? Is victory in this situation worth that guy quitting the hobby in disgust—even if it is disgust at his own commander?
I do not want to remove the keen and competitive edge. I like the aggression. Instead, I want you, the leaders, to help me make sure that while our guys and gals remain intensely aggressive, we are also, as a whole, fair, honorable—and safe.
If we have created the “L” shape by rapid maneuver, and if the tactical commander on the spot at the “L” recognizes that there is nothing to be gained by pressing, he should take immediate action to solve the problem. First, he should calm his own men by pointing out the possible safety hazard. If possible, he should communicate to the local commander opposite him his frustration—in effect, ask the opponent to withdraw and PROMISE HIM TIME TO DO IT WELL. Offer your opponent the “Golden Bridge” to rebuilding his line in a safe manner at a safe distance. If all else fails, the tactical commander on the spot should consider withdrawing himself—if your opponent cannot handle a war of maneuver, there’s not much you can do except return the battle to a safe situation on your own initiative, however galling it may be to cede a tactical advantage.
I was the leader in one of these incidents. I know just how I made each decision, and with what motivation. But bottom line—we in the Northern Brigade fancy ourselves a cut above other groups. That may or may not be true, but if it is, remember then, that the burden of going the extra mile, acting honorably, behaving well, and being SAFE will always lie with the better disciplined, better led unit. If that's really who we are—then the burden lies on us.
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